Introduction
This is the second work in which I advocate for the extension of confrontation rights at felony sentencing hearings. In the first work,
Making the Right Call for Confrontation at Felony Sentencing,
1 I examined and challenged whether judicial authority existed in preFounding felony cases to consider un-cross-examined testimony for purposes of fixing punishment. This Article examines and challenges another popular argument against confrontation at felony sentencing: that confrontation only applies at the trial stage of the "criminal prosecution." The majority of the federal circuit courts that have examined the question of confrontation rights at felony sentencing have ruled that the Confrontation Clause is a right that only applies at trial.
2 I reexamine this [M] ost of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open court by witnesses subject to cross-examination.") (quoting Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250 (1949))). But see United States v. Fortier, 911 F.2d 100, 103-04 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that while there is a right to cross-examine witnesses at criminal sentencing, the hearsay standard of reliability governs confrontation challenges), overruled by United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 400 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (" [P] rotections of the The Confrontation Clause is not the only fundamental Sixth Amendment right to be branded a right that only applies at trial. In the past, neither the Counsel nor the Jury Trial Clauses automatically applied at felony sentencing.
10 Gideon v. Wainwright eventually applied the Counsel Clause to all critical stages of the criminal prosecution, 11 which was ultimately deemed to include sentencing in Mempa v. Rhay.
12
McMillan v. Pennsylvania initially established that the Jury Trial Clause only applied to "elements" of the offense, not to "enhancements" to the punishment. 13 The distinction proved significant considering that elements must be established beyond a reasonable doubt at trial and enhancements could be established by a preponderance of the evidence at sentencing.
14 Apprendi v. New Jersey radically changed the trial "element" versus sentencing "enhancement" distinction and applied the Jury Trial Clause to any fact that increased the statutory maximum punishment.
15 During the 2013 term, the Court quietly but dramatically expanded the scope of Apprendi to include mandatory minimum sentences in Alleyne v. United States.
16
I advocate for reexamination of the theory that the Confrontation Clause is a right that only applies at trial. The Counsel, Confrontation, and Jury Trial Clauses are structurally identical and appear to apply in a broad sense "[i]n all criminal prosecutions."
17 Each has been deemed essential to our system of criminal prosecutions 18 but until recently it was generally well accepted that the Confrontation Clause only "reflect[ed] a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial."
19 Previously, there was 11. 372 U.S. at 343-45 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932) 20 The understanding of lower courts that examined the applicability of the Confrontation Clause at felony sentencing was that confrontation and hearsay both originated from due process and were designed to protect similar values-trustworthiness and reliability.
21 But the Court's re-examination of the historical origin and text of the Confrontation Clause in Crawford v. Washington established that " [w] here testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation." Ultimately, I argue that where testimonial statements are material to punishment and where cross-examination will assist the fact finder in assessing truth, confrontation should be branded as a right that applies through sentencing.
that the primary purpose of confrontation is to ensure reliability, but that face-to-face confrontation is only a preference).
20. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
24
The introductory clause, "[i]n all criminal prosecutions," prefaces all of the included procedural rights and protections, 25 of which there are as many as seven. This Article focuses on three: the Counsel, Jury Trial, and Confrontation Clauses.
26
The Sixth Amendment is silent with regard to whether sentencing is part of the "criminal prosecution," a term that the Amendment leaves undefined. Moreover, Founding era documents do not provide guidance on the meaning or scope of the term.
27 This is not surprising, because at the time of ratification, felony sentencing was determinate.
28 Essentially, sentencing proceedings were "virtually indistinguishable from the process of conviction."
29 Felony crimes were submitted to a jury and punishment was linked to the crime. 30 This model of "unitary prosecution" 31 required felony "sentencing evidence" to be presented to a jury and confronted by defense counsel during the trial. 32 The trial was the sentencing in purpose and effect.
33
An "original objective meaning" interpretation 34 of the Sixth Amendment supports the argument that pre-Founding "criminal prosecutions" included sentencing.
35
An early nineteenth century dictionary defined the term "prosecution" as the "institution or commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal tribunal, and 30. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000); see also 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *376 (requiring that after verdict, "the court must pronounce that judgment, which the law hath annexed to the crime"); Bibas, supra note 27, at 46, 48 (noting that after a conviction the punishment was immediately imposed); Douglass, supra note 28, at 1977 (describing English and early American criminal law as dominated by mandatory penalties, not by sentencing discretion); McMurray, supra note 23, at 592 (describing sentences in the determinate era as corporal punishment or specific fine and noting that from the face of the charging instrument, defendants could predict a sentence with precision); White, supra note 29, at 397 (characterizing substantive criminal law as sanction-specific or prescribing a specific sentence for an offense).
31. Douglass, supra note 28, at 2008; White, supra note 29, at 397 (noting that in 1789, two years before ratification of the Sixth Amendment, "'criminal prosecution[s]' began with the return of an indictment that contained sufficient facts to notify the defendant of the charge. The jury in the case then heard the evidence and determined both the guilt and the punishment of the defendant.").
32. The rules appeared to be different for misdemeanors. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 480 n.7 (noting that colonial sentencing judges frequently imposed fines in misdemeanor cases); see also Douglass, supra note 28, at 2016 (noting that in the late eighteenth century, English and colonial American judges exercised discretion in punishing misdemeanants).
33. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 1972 ("Bifurcation-separating the guilt determination from the choice of an appropriate penalty-was a procedure that evolved after the [F]ounding, initially for noncapital sentencing."); see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 51 (describing pre-Founding sentencing as part of the trial).
34. "Original objective meaning" or "original public meaning" refers to "the reasonable meaning of the text of the Constitution at the time of the framing." Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the Records of the State Ratifying Conventions As a Source of the Original Meaning of the U.S. Constitution, 2009 U. Ill. L. Rev. 457, 462. According to Maggs, some Justices, particularly Antonin Scalia, consider this meaning to be the most significant. Id. As used in this work, "original objective meaning" should be distinguished from "original intent" and "original understanding." Original intent is the meaning the Constitution's Framers intended, i.e., the meaning and intention of the convention that framed and proposed the Constitution for adoption and ratification in the states. Id. at 461. Original understanding refers to what those persons who participated in state ratifying conventions thought the Constitution meant. Id.
35. See Douglass, supra note 28, at 2008 (arguing that the answer to the question whether sentencing is part of the "criminal prosecution" is self-evident because "why bother with the process of criminal prosecution if not for the sentence?"); see also White, supra note 29, at 393 (asserting that the argument that the right to confront applies at a capital sentencing hearing is supported by a simple reading of the relevant constitutional text). At least one jurist agreed with Douglass and White. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Surely no one would contend that sentencing is not a part, and a vital one, of a 'criminal prosecution.'"). pursuing them to final judgment."
36 Eminent pre-Founding scholar William Blackstone 37 described twelve stages of the prosecution, ranging from the arrest to execution.
38 Blackstone did not specifically list or separately label sentencing hearings.
39 But his ninth stage, which was labeled "Judgment, and its consequences," corresponds to our modern understanding of criminal sentencing. 40 In fact, at sentencing modern courts do precisely what Blackstone described at the "judgment" stage.
41
Contemporary scholarship agrees with Blackstone's description of the sentencing process as one stage of a criminal prosecution.
42 Francis Heller, a mid-twentieth century historian, explained that the "criminal prosecution" started at arraignment and ended after the sentence was announced, unless the defendant was found not guilty. Mempa remains the preeminent post-ratification case discussing the application of the Counsel Clause at felony sentencing proceedings in state and federal courts.
51 Mempa involved unrelated convictions of two defendants who pleaded guilty in Washington state court on the advice of counsel.
52 Both defendants were sentenced to terms of imprisonment and released on probation under Washington's deferred sentencing statutes. 53 The prosecutor moved to have the probations revoked because other crimes were allegedly committed post-release. 54 Neither defendant was provided counsel at their probation revocation hearings, and both were re-incarcerated as a result. 55 Both defendants filed habeas petitions and claimed violations of the Counsel Clause.
56 The Court reversed the Washington Supreme Court's denial of both petitions.
57
Admittedly, Mempa does not answer the question whether the Confrontation Clause applies at sentencing. But Mempa ultimately rejected a strict trial-right-only theory of the Counsel Clause and acknowledged that post-trial proceedings could be of a critical nature in a criminal case.
58 In doing so, the Mempa Court was not persuaded by arguments that the revocation hearing was a mere formality or that any violation of the Counsel Clause was remedied because defendants were provided with the assistance of counsel at trial.
59 At the revocation hearing, counsel was necessary for marshaling and proving the facts, introducing evidence, and generally aiding and assisting the defendants.
60
Fundamentally, the Court affirmed Gideon's mandate of counsel at every stage of the "criminal prosecution" that implicated procedural and substantial rights.
II. Origin and Erosion of the Jury Trial Clause as Only a Trial
Right The rule that the Jury Trial Clause applied solely at the trial stage of a criminal prosecution developed simultaneously as indeterminate sentencing lost favor as the dominant model of fixing punishment in the United States. During the indeterminate era, broad judicial discretion existed to ensure that punishment fit the offender as well as the offense.
61
At the height of the indeterminate era, judicial discretion was curbed only by the Eighth Amendment's proscription against excessive fines and (2005) . Berman argues that the "rehabilitative medical model" was conceived and discussed in medical terms, with offenders described as sick and punishments aspiring to cure. cruel and unusual punishment.
62 Sentencing judges were not required to seek the jury's guidance 63 and frequently engaged in post-trial fact finding to punish within the statutory range.
64 This contrasted sharply with preFounding determinate era felony sentencing, when judges rarely engaged in post-verdict fact finding to fix punishment. 64. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 52. Hessick and Hessick noted that discretionary schemes were originally premised on the punishment rational of rehabilitation and that judges' assessments were based on specific sentencing characteristics with an eye toward reforming the criminal defendant's law breaking ways. Id. Sentencing characteristics included the defendant's age, prior criminal history, employment history, family ties, educational level, military service, and charitable activities. Id.
65. McMurray, supra note 23, at 592 (noting that confrontation at sentencing was irrelevant under the determinate model because there was no fact finding at the time the sentence was announced and thus, no witnesses to confront). Blackstone reported that only in exceptional cases did determinate era sentencing judges exercise discretion to impose fines or determine the length of imprisonment. Blackstone, supra note 30, at *378. Generally, the "nature of the punishment . . . he public mind is becoming so accustomed to lawlessness that it is acquiring that listless indifference which long and unconcerned familiarity begets. Unpunished crime has become a matter-of-course thing in the public mind.").
68. See Miller, supra note 66, at 20 (noting the inadequacy of courts to accommodate their increased burden and the irksome burden of jury duty on the public); see also Large increases in "outlawry" further evidenced the inability of authorities to handle "modern" crime.
71 J.C. McWhorter, an early twentieth century legal commentator, lamented in 1923 that the public had become listlessly indifferent to lawlessness because crime so often went unpunished.
72 As incarceration became an increasingly available form of punishment, the public was increasingly persuaded by policy arguments in favor of individualized rather than determinate sentences.
73
The role of counsel in criminal cases also expanded during the indeterminate era, 74 perhaps as a direct effect of the Constitution's adoption of an adversarial system of trial, or perhaps due to the increase in criminality.
75 Throughout the U.S. colonies, knowledgeable and experienced defense bars emerged.
76 By the mid-eighteenth century, the acquittal rate for represented defendants in New Jersey was seventyseven percent, while the acquittal rate for unrepresented defendants was merely eighteen percent. 77 In 1834, almost a century later, virtually every defendant in New York requested or received the assistance of counsel.
78
That counsel was available to defendants did not mean that the adversarial system that we know today existed during the emergence of indeterminate sentencing.
79 The point here is that by the height of the indeterminate era, the United States had developed a distinct adversarial system. Yet few constitutionally prescribed controls limited judicial discretion at felony sentencing, in part due to a lack of uniform sentencing procedures and in part due to a reduced number of felony trials.
Counsel's expanded role emerged simultaneously with two other notable developments of post-Founding indeterminate sentencing: pleabargaining 80 and bifurcation of trial and sentencing. 81 Bifurcation created that the jury has "lived out the days of . . . usefulness," stating that it was "difficult to imagine a more illogical and unbusiness-like way of trying cases than by a jury of twelve men selected as they are"). separate "sentencing hearings," resulting in a distinct and separate procedural phase of the criminal prosecution 82 during which judges exercised broad discretion to determine the length of imprisonment.
83 By necessity, this appeared to require consideration of information about the defendant that was not presented during the trial.
84 Once guilt was entered, sentencing judges exercised virtually unlimited discretion to determine the range of imprisonment.
85
It is difficult to pinpoint when bifurcation or guilty pleas became the norm. Like bifurcation, evidence of guilty pleas prior to the Founding in the English common law system and the U.S. colonies is rare.
86 But by the late 1830s, guilty pleas arose in the colonies, and ten years later, they were accepted for practically every sort of offense.
87 By mid-century, plea bargaining was well institutionalized 88 and judges were willingly involved in the process.
89 But early plea bargaining may not have been initiated by plea bargaining during the 1830s and 1840s). 82. See Herman, supra note 29, at 302. 83. Douglass, supra note 28, at 2019. Douglass suggests that bifurcation was the result of the need to separately consider information at a sentencing hearing that could not be introduced at trial. Id. at 2018-19 (arguing that the rules of evidence conflicted with the emerging preference for making punishment fit not only the crime, but also the individual criminal because evidence relating to bad character was considered unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible at trial).
84. Id. at 2018 (noting the new goal of individualized sentences and arguing that if indeterminate era "judges were to tailor their sentences to fit individual offenders, they needed to know more about that individual than a trial-or guilty plea-was likely to tell them").
85. Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 606-07. 86. See Vogel, supra note 80, at 161, 173. 87. See id. at 175 (demonstrating surge in guilty pleas in Boston from less than 15% in 1830, to 28.6% in 1840, 52% in 1850, 55.6% in 1860, and 88% in 1880). Vogel argued that plea bargaining rose as part of a "process of political stabilization," as part of an "effort to legitimate institutions of selfrule," and as part of an imposition of "social control in a way that avoided any delegitimizing use of force." Id. at 161, 227.
88. See id. at 174-75 (discussing plea bargaining in nineteenth century Boston). 89. Miller, supra note 66, at 2. Miller argued that the concept of forgiveness by an aggrieved person, which he described as "condonation," was long recognized by 1927, but had no effect in preventing prosecution. Id. "In practice, however, the condonation and compromise of criminal cases [was] frequent and the methods of evading the clear purpose of the written law [were] varied." See id.; see also Moley, supra note 69, at 107, 118 (noting generational increase in the proportion of guilty pleas). Moley notes that by 1926 in Cook County, Illinois, 13,117 felony prosecutions entered the same parties as it is today. Some indeterminate era judges openly bargained with the defendant in court 90 while others refused to participate in negotiations between the parties.
91 Judges who participated in pleas could have also privately expressed to the parties the propriety of a settlement.
92
Critics of indeterminate sentencing initially questioned the lack of procedural and substantive rules governing the bifurcated sentencing hearings 93 -and to a lesser extent, guilty pleas. 94 The Honorable Marvin E. Frankel, widely considered the father of modern sentencing reform, 95 lamented wide disparities in punishment, which substantively turned "arbitrarily upon the variegated passions and prejudices of individual judges."
96 Judge Frankel also noted the absence of procedural rules 97 and the limited role of appellate courts, which had authority to review preliminary hearing and 492 resulted in a complete jury trial; during the same year in Chicago, slightly more than one percent of cases initiated as felonies resulted in a jury verdict of guilty on the felony charge. Id. There also appeared to be an increase in jury trial waivers, presumably in favor of bench trials. See Warner & Cabot, supra note 67, at 592 (noting that in the late nineteenth century waiver of jury trial in criminal cases was common in few states, but that by 1937 it was "permitted by constitution, statute or judicial decision in the federal courts and those of over half the states"). These sources do not specify whether the remaining cases were resolved by dismissals, guilty pleas, or bench trials.
90. See id.; see also Moley, supra note 69, at 103 (describing the early use of guilty pleas as a defense strategy that also had advantages for prosecutors, who would not be "compelled to carry through an onerous and protracted trial," and judges, who "escape[] the danger of being reversed on some point of law").
91. Miller, supra note 66, at 8, 10. Cases in which pleas were commonly used included violation of liquor laws; automobile thefts; desertion or failure to provide for wife or children; sex cases, including seduction and statutory rape; and larceny or accusations for issuing fraudulent checks or obtaining money or property by fraudulent means. , at C15 (describing Frankel as a "legal scholar whose views helped to establish sentencing guidelines for federal courts"). This Article refers to the federal sentencing guidelines as "the Guidelines."
96. Frankel, supra note 93, at 5, 7-8; Berman, supra note 61, at 655 (noting that some outcomes and disparities could be attributed to race, gender, and socioeconomic status).
97. Marvin E. Frankel, Sentencing Guidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 Yale L.J. 2043, 2044 (1992) (noting common use of information at sentencing that had not been cross-examined or otherwise exposed to adversarial or independent scrutiny). sentences only on rare or extraordinary grounds.
98 He pondered whether rehabilitative goals were necessary and realistic 99 and noted that judges and probation officers rarely communicated about a defendant or his "treatment."
100 Finally, Judge Frankel described the trial court's physical observations of the defendant as a minor and fleeting factor at best, and at worst-overdrawn and overweighed judicial folklore. 107. Winship, 397 U.S. at 364. According to the Court, the requirement of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt dated at least to the Founding and was long assumed to be constitutionally required in criminal cases. Id. at 360, 362. But see id. at 377 (Black, J., dissenting) (doubting whether guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt was expressly or impliedly commanded in the Constitution). At the Founding, guilt by proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required in both delinquency proceeding against juveniles and criminal proceedings against adults. Id. at 367-68. But see id. at 386 (Black, J., dissenting) ("[W]hen, as here, a State through its duly constituted legislative branch decides to apply a determine which facts were necessary to prove the charge.
108 A narrow approach was chosen in Mullaney, which only required proof beyond reasonable doubt of the "elements of the offense."
109 Two years later, Patterson excluded affirmative defenses from the category of facts that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
110
Less than a decade after Winship, Mullaney, and Patterson, the federal government and the states heeded calls for limited judicial discretion at criminal sentencing and for structured criminal procedural rules that provided tougher appellate review of sentences.
111 The Sentencing Reform Act ("SRA") was passed in 1984 and would provide the blueprint for felony sentencing rules in federal courts.
112 The SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission ("Commission"), which was tasked with drafting the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines").
113 The Guidelines rejected rehabilitation as the central principle for structured sentencing and expressly called for sentences to provide "just punishment."
114 The Guidelines also calculated punishment different standard, then that standard, unless it is otherwise unconstitutional, must be applied to insure that persons are treated according to the 'law of the land.'"). by assigning points to specific facts 115 about the offender and offense. 116 The Guidelines were mandatory: sentencing courts were required to explain the basis for departures from the applicable range of punishment 117 and appellate courts were granted increased authority to review sentences.
118
Two years after the SRA was enacted, the Supreme Court tested Pennsylvania's Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Act ("MMSA") 119 in McMillan v. Pennsylvania. The MMSA imposed a minimum sentence of five years for offenses committed while in "visible possession" of a firearm.
120 The MMSA did not require visible possession to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt before application of the five-year minimum sentence.
121 Instead, the MMSA permitted Pennsylvania sentencing judges to consider evidence already introduced at trial as well as evidence produced for the first time at the sentencing hearing, all of which would be judged by the court by a preponderance of the evidence.
122 If the prosecution established that the underlying offense involved visible possession of a firearm, the MMSA divested sentencing judges of discretion to impose a sentence of less than five years.
123
Presumably, sentences in excess of the statutory maximum were also not authorized.
124 Four Pennsylvania sentencing judges refused to apply the MMSA because it did not allow the jury to evaluate visible possession.
125
The Court coined the term "sentencing enhancement," 126 which was distinguishable from an "offense element," and held that state legislatures had authority to designate certain facts as "enhancements." 127 115. Breyer, supra note 113, at 7-8. Categories and sentence length were determined by an analysis of 10,000 actual cases. See id. at 7; see also Becker, supra note 7, at 7-8.
116. See Breyer, supra note 113, at 5; see also Bascuas, supra note 80, at 8-9 (discussing methodology of the Guidelines); Becker, supra note 7, at 7-8 (same).
117 133 Castillo was indicted for conspiring to murder federal officers in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1), which prohibited the use or carrying of a "firearm" in relation to a crime of violence.
134 Penalties increased dramatically when the firearm was a machine gun. 135 The Court held that the "machine gun" finding constituted an element of a separate offense.
136
Castillo found type of firearm an offense element despite the fact that Congress designated it a sentencing enhancement. The Castillo Court made five specific findings to support its holding that firearm type was an offense element. First, the statute listed the basic offense elements in the first sentence and the sentencing enhancements in the remaining subsequent sentences. Id. at 124-25. Second, the type of firearm had not typically or traditionally been a sentencing factor because it neither involved characteristics of the offender nor special features the offense. Id. at 126-27. Third, to ask a jury, rather than the judge, to determine the type of firearm would rarely complicate trial or result in unfairness. Id. at 127-28. Fourth, the legislative history did not support interpreting section 924(c) as setting forth sentencing factors. Id. at 129-30. Finally, the twenty-five year increase attached to the machine gun finding was extreme, which weighed in favor of treating firearm type as an element. Id. at 131.
debate focused on procedural and substantive characteristics of felony sentencing at the time of the Founding.
138 A slight majority had come to understand that pre-Founding a pre-determined sentence resulted 139 once the jury found guilt.
140 This majority believed that the Sixth Amendment's text and structure reflected pre-Founding determinate jury sentencing in felony cases.
141
On the day Castillo ruled that type of firearm was an element under section 924(c), Apprendi v. New Jersey overturned a sentence that was also based, in part, on post-verdict judicial fact finding.
142 Apprendi was convicted under a New Jersey statute that classified unlawful possession of a firearm a second-degree offense.
143 Punishment for unlawful possession of a firearm ranged from five to ten years.
144 Under a separate statute, New Jersey extended the term of imprisonment for unlawful possession while committing a racially motivated crime.
145 The racial motive-or "hate crime" enhancement-did not require a jury, could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and increased punishment to a range of was adopted in 1791, the States uniformly followed the common-law practice of making death the exclusive and mandatory sentence for certain specified offenses."). Death could be accomplished by hanging, embowelment, and burying alive. Blackstone, supra note 30, at *376-77. By no means was death the exclusive punishment for felonies, merely the most common. See id. at *377. Other punishment included deprivation of sensation by strangling, mutilation or dismembering, slitting of the nostrils, branding of the hand, whipping, hard labor, exile, banishment, loss of liberty, and temporary imprisonment. Id. Despite these myriad of options, Blackstone makes clear that the quantity or degree of punishment was "ascertained for every offence [,] and that it [wa]s not left in the breast of any judge, nor even of a jury, to alter that judgment." Id. Blackstone warned that "if judgments were to be the private opinions of the judge, men would then be slaves to their magistrates [,] and would live in society without knowing exactly the conditions and obligations which it lays them under." Id.
140. White, supra note 29, at 396 (describing the modern day trial as involving a bifurcated process by which there is a finding of guilt or innocence by a jury and a subsequent determination of punishment by a judge); Douglass, supra note 28, at 1968 (describing the trial world as a highly structured and elaborate body of precedent that defines substantive rights, but describing the sentencing world as an informal, free-flowing kind of place that has with few hard rules). According to Douglass, "few 'trial rights' survive intact after a guilty verdict." Id.
141. Hessick & Hessick, supra note 29, at 51 (noting that determinate sentencing schemes "presented no occasion to consider the extent to which constitutional protections should be treated differently at sentencing than at trial"). But see Fenner, supra note 21, at 37; Nancy J. ten to twenty years. 146 Apprendi pleaded guilty to unlawful possession and was never charged with any type of hate crime.
147 The judge imposed a twelve-year sentence based on the court's own finding at sentencing that Apprendi's acts were racially motivated.
148 The New Jersey Supreme Court, relying on McMillan, affirmed and held that motivation was a traditional sentencing factor.
149
The Apprendi Court examined the adequacy of New Jersey's sentencing procedure and qualified McMillan's longstanding deference to legislative choice between elements and enhancements. The Court reasoned that the right to a jury determination of guilt of every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt was a historical foundation of the common law.
150 The Court reflected on criminal prosecutions at time of the Founding and the lack of judicial discretion because of sanctionspecific criminal laws.
151 During the Founding, guilt and punishment were invariably linked and there was no distinction between an element and an enhancement.
152 In the Court's view, even though the practice of unitary trial and sentencing may have changed, modern courts must still "adhere to the basic principle [s] ."
153 Because the jury trial right was one of surpassing importance in the common law, 154 there was no "principled basis for treating [enhancements and elements] differently."
155 Guilt beyond a reasonable doubt was designated a historically significant companion right to a jury verdict.
156 Both reflected "a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered." unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range of penalties."); see also Fisher, supra note 126, at 56 (concluding that the firearm enhancement was a classic example of an aggravated crime, and describing Apprendi as a very easy case).
that was foreshadowed a year earlier 160 : "any fact [other than a prior conviction] that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
161 By its terms, Apprendi applied only when postverdict judicial fact finding involved imposition of a sentence more severe than the statutory maximum. 162 The Court ruled that the hate crime enhancement required a jury determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt without reference to Castillo.
163
A broad reading of Apprendi seemed to require a jury determination of all facts that would increase punishment, which would fundamentally implicate structured sentencing schemes like the Guidelines. At least one member of the Apprendi majority rejected this view; one dissenter foresaw the threat.
164 Arguments that McMillian authorized legislatures-not sentencing commissions-to choose between elements and enhancements strengthened after Apprendi. 165 The Guidelines and other structured sentencing schemes were alleged to have eliminated judicial discretion too much, 166 which in turn lead to increased prosecutorial authority 167 and
160. See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999). 161. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490; see also Knoll & Singer, supra note 110, at 1114 ("The big news in Jones, however, is that the Court all but adopted a Constitutional rule, based on the Sixth Amendment jury trial right, precluding the designation as a sentencing factor any item that would significantly increase the sentence.").
162. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 487 n.13; see also Levine, supra note 131, at 405. 163. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475-76 ("The question whether [Mr.] Apprendi had a constitutional right to have a jury find such bias on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is starkly presented." (emphasis added)).
164. Compare Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 n.11 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[i]t is likewise unnecessary to consider whether . . . the rule regarding elements applies to the . . . Guidelines"), with id. at 551-52 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (questioning whether after Apprendi, state and federal courts should continue to assume the constitutionality of structured sentencing schemes like the Guidelines); see also Alex Ricciardulli, The U.S. Supreme Court's Surprise Ruling on Sentence Enhancements, L.A. Law., Feb. 2001, at 15 (noting that "[s]eldom has so big a case [Apprendi] received so little attention" and predicting the Guidelines did not implicate Apprendi unless a sentence greater than the maximum authorized by statute was imposed). Ricciardulli explains that the Guidelines and other structured sentencing laws merely allow increases in sentences within the statutory range and that such increases fall within Apprendi's limiting principle. Id. at 16. "Laws that allow increases beyond a range, on the other hand, are in trouble." See id.; see also Herman, supra note 29, at 296-97, 336-38, 344-45 (questioning the applicability of McMillan to the issue of the constitutionality of the Guidelines).
165. 172 Harris involved whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) defines a single crime, to which brandishing is a sentencing factor that may be considered by a judge after the trial, or multiple crimes, to which brandishing is an essential element that must be proved to a jury.
173 Section 924(c)(1)(A)-as amended since Castilloprovides in relevant part:
[A]ny person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime-(i) be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 5 years; (ii) if the firearm is brandished, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 7 years; and (iii) if the firearm is discharged, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of not less than 10 years.
174
In the indictment, the government neither alleged brandishing nor referenced subsection (ii).
175 Instead, the indictment charged that Harris computator; also discussing change in presentence report from an instrument of potential mercy and mitigation to an instrument of inquisition and punishment).
168. See Barkow, supra note 117, at 85-87 (arguing that the Guidelines allowed little room to bend the law as a matter of justice or equity); see also Klein, supra note 63, at 708; Bascuas, supra note 80, at 37-38.
169. See Berman, supra note 94, at 285; Berman, supra note 9, at 396-97; see also Mark Chenoweth, Using Its Sixth Sense: The Roberts Court Revamps the Rights of the Accused, 2009 Cato Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 239-40 (discussing Apprendi and concluding that removal of basic fact finding from juries violated jury trial rights); Huigens, supra note 114, at 1062, 1069-73 (distinguishing between indeterminate and guidelines sentencing, and noting the latter treats "sentencing like an exercise in the definition and adjudication of offense elements, so that the sentencing process more and more resembles the trial process").
170. Barkow, supra note 117, at 109-12 (arguing that the Guidelines linked facts with punishment and that such factual determinations were traditionally made by juries); Berman, supra note 94, at 286 ("Twentieth century . . . sentencing regimes . . . changed the landscape and have appropriately raised Sixth Amendment concerns.").
171. See Berman, supra note 61, at 659-60, 672 (discussing the Guidelines' lack of procedural rules); see also knowingly carried a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 176 Harris was sentenced to seven years 177 based on the finding at the sentencing hearing that he brandished a firearm.
178 The Fourth Circuit ruled brandishing a sentencing factor, as had every other federal circuit court to address the question.
179 The plurality agreed.
180
The Harris plurality grounded itself on McMillan's broad grant of legislative authority to determine which facts were offense elements and which facts were sentencing enhancements.
181 The Harris plurality acknowledged that section 924(c)(1)(A) did not explicitly designate brandishing as an element or sentencing factor, but offered two competing interpretations of the statute. Either section 924(c)(1)(A) was structured like most federal statutes, which listed the offense elements in a single sentence and the separate sentencing factors into subsections.
182 Or alternatively, Section 924(c)(1)(A) was a statute that appeared to list all offense elements in a single sentence but was nevertheless interpreted as setting out the elements of multiple offenses.
183 The plurality identified two "critical textual clues" to distinguish between its two interpretations. First, historically Congress had not treated brandishing as an offense element.
184
Second, the two-year increase for brandishing was insignificant.
185
Harris also distinguished McMillian-type facts that increased the mandatory minimum sentence from Apprendi-type facts that increased the mandatory maximum sentence. 
finding.
188 Judicial fact finding in the course of selecting a sentence outside the authorized maximum range implicates the Sixth Amendment.
189 As even Apprendi acknowledges (albeit in a footnote), only increases in the penalty above what the law provides function like traditional elements.
190
Thus, only "those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence . . . are elements of the crime for the purposes of the constitutional analysis."
191
Despite Harris, the Court declared that Apprendi applied more broadly to state and federal sentencing guidelines. In Blakely v. Washington, the Court invalidated a thirty-seven month enhancement imposed under state sentencing guidelines for "deliberate cruelty" on the grounds that the determination was not made by a jury.
192 The next year the Court considered whether the Guidelines were unconstitutional.
193 In United States v. Booker, and its companion case United States v. Fanfan, defendants received sentencing enhancements in federal court based on amounts of drugs, role in the offense, and obstruction of justice.
194
In separate majority opinions, the Court ruled that the Guidelines violated the Apprendi rule, but not fatally so.
195 The first Booker majority concluded that a jury determination of facts that raised the sentencing ceiling was constitutionally protected as a firmly rooted basic precept of the common law.
196 This majority distinguished between mandatory and advisory sentencing models for Sixth Amendment purposes. Mandatory guidelines implicated the Jury Trial Clause 197 -advisory guidelines did not. 198 The first Booker majority agreed with Blakely that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes was "the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant."
199 The Jury Trial Clause was violated to the extent that the Guidelines required judicial fact finding at sentencing hearings. The second Booker majority focused on whether the Guidelines could be remedied.
200 Exercising its power of severability, the Court ruled that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines made them incompatible with the U.S. Constitution.
201 Advisory guidelines and a reasonableness standard of appellate review cured these incompatibilities. 205 Alleyne involved the same federal criminal statute at issue in Harris, section 924(c)(1)(A), and asked the same question as Harris, whether brandishing under subsection (ii) was an essential element or a sentencing enhancement.
206 Alleyne was convicted of one count of robbery affecting interstate commerce and one count of using or carrying a firearm during a crime of violence.
207 Alleyne was also charged with brandishing a firearm under subsection (ii) 208 but the jury did not find Alleyne guilty of that offense. 209 At sentencing, the district court imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of seven years based on the finding that by a preponderance of the evidence Alleyne could have reasonably foreseen that his accomplice would brandish a firearm.
210 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the post-verdict finding that brandishing occurred.
211
The Alleyne Court ruled that Apprendi encompassed "not only facts that increase the ceiling, but also those that increase the floor."
212 Alleyne is premised on the "clear" relationship at common law between crime and punishment.
213 Additionally, in the common law substantive criminal law tended to be sanction specific. In other words, a particular sentence was prescribed for a particular offense.
214 Alleyne reasoned that at common law the "legally prescribed" penalty affixed to the crime included both ends of the punishment range.
215 It followed that any fact that triggered both the mandatory (or statutory) maximum and minimum sentence were "ingredient[s]" of the offense.
216 Elevating the low-end or "floor" of a sentencing range heightened "the loss of liberty associated with the crime"
217 and is as relevant as the high-end or "ceiling." 218 Apprendi's foundation is to ensure that a defendant can "predict the legally applicable penalty from the face of the indictment." 219 In the Alleyne Court's view, expanding Apprendi to include facts necessary to increase the mandatory minimum sentence allows a defendant to do so.
220
Alleyne acknowledges that judicial fact finding at felony sentencing is a post-Founding development.
221 At the time of the Founding, little judicial discretion existed to influence felony punishment. Offense conduct that merited punishment was determined during the trial and sentencing only consisted of announcing the judgment. Modern bifurcation of the trial and sentencing stages of the criminal prosecution has shifted fact finding on offense conduct (and to a lesser extent offender characteristics) into a structured sentencing hearing. Once guilt is accepted (either as a result of a trial or a plea), sentencing becomes the basically a trial right," 229 but Barber was not a felony sentencing case.
230
Neither was Mancusi, although the ruling in that case affected Stubbs's punishment. Stubbs was convicted and sentenced under New York's second offender law based in part on a Tennessee murder conviction that had been overturned due to the denial of effective counsel. 231 The New York court admitted witness statements from the prior Tennessee trial over Stubbs's objection. 232 The Mancusi Court found that there was sufficient evidence that the testimony of the unavailable Tennessee witness was reliable.
233
Thus, the overturned Tennessee murder conviction could be counted as the predicate offense under New York's second offender law.
Barber and Mancusi rely heavily on the assumption that confrontation has always enjoyed a peaceful coexistence with hearsay rules.
234 Barber and Mancusi were decided at a time when literal application of the Confrontation Clause was rejected for fear of abrogating most of the hearsay exceptions.
235 Both cases turn on the prosecution's good faith showing of unavailability and defendant's prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness. Like Barber and Mancusi, Roberts established that the Confrontation Clause reflected only a "preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial." 241 Roberts was arrested and charged with forgery and possession of stolen credit cards. 242 At trial, Roberts testified that Anita Isaacs, the daughter of the victims, 243 provided the checkbook and credit cards with the understanding that he was allowed to use them.
244 Upon questioning by defense counsel at the preliminary hearing Isaacs admitted that she knew Roberts and that she permitted Roberts to stay at her apartment for several days while she was away, but that she neither gave Roberts her parents' checks and credit cards nor granted him permission to use them. 245 Because Isaacs did not appear at trial, 246 the prosecution was allowed to admit her preliminary hearing transcript to rebut Roberts's testimony. 247 While acknowledging that the Confrontation Clause was intended to limit some hearsay, the Roberts Court affirmed Mancusi and Barber to the extent that where a witness was unavailable, the confrontation requirement was satisfied by hearsay that was reliable and trustworthy. 248 The Court found that the prosecution made a good faith showing of unavailability and that Roberts had an adequate opportunity to cross-examine Isaacs during the preliminary hearing.
249
Roberts, Mancusi, and Barber are incompatible outliers from the Court's more recent interpretations of the Confrontation Clause, beginning with Crawford v. Washington. 250 Crawford involved the admission of pre-recorded testimonial statements by a wife against her husband, the defendant, and against whom she could not testify based on spousal privilege. 251 The Washington Supreme Court had previously affirmed admission of Mrs. Crawford's recorded statements, satisfied that they were both reliable and trustworthy. 252 The Crawford Court reversed and reasoned that hearsay rules have strayed too far from confrontation's "original meaning."
253
Crawford recognized two historical inferences about the Founders' understanding of confrontation: first, the Confrontation Clause was intended to prohibit ex parte examinations as evidence against the accused;
254 second, preratification testimonial statements of absent witnesses would not have been allowed without a showing of unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. 255 The Crawford Court ruled that the due process standard was too unpredictable.
256
Confrontation standards were higher: "Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation."
257
The Court ultimately found that Mrs. Crawford's statements closely paralleled those the Framers intended to regulate 258 and that the admission of those statements violated Mr. Crawford's confrontation rights. 259 Noting that "testimonial statements" can be used for purposes other than establishing the truth of the matter asserted, 260 the Court explicitly limited the scope of the Confrontation Clause to "witnesses against the accused" who "bear testimony."
261
Crawford's interpretation of the Confrontation Clause applied only to testimonial statements; non-testimonial statements did not require more than reliability.
262 Davis v. Washington clarified the distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial statements.
263
Davis involved the admissibility of statements of unavailable witnesses in unrelated criminal trials in Washington state and Indiana. The Washington courts concluded that statements made in response to questions from 911 operator who answered a victim's call about a domestic dispute were non-testimonial and admissible. 264 The Indiana courts disagreed about admission of a victim affidavit that was executed and given to law enforcement officers who responded to a domestic disturbance complaint at the victim's home.
265
Davis held that statements were testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicated that no ongoing emergency existed and that the primary purpose of the interrogation (or questioning) was to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to a subsequent criminal prosecution.
266 Statements are non-testimonial, however, when given in the course of an interrogation (or questioning) and where circumstances objectively indicate that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to assist police during an ongoing emergency.
267
Crawford makes clear that actual confrontation and crossexamination are the best methods to test the veracity of testimonial statements, and Davis demonstrates the fluidity of the testimonial/nontestimonial distinction. 268 As confrontation speaks to the method of testing evidence, the rules governing the method of testing could easily apply at felony sentencing, and already leave vast room for judicial discretion. 269 The Guidelines place no limitations on the use of information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a convicted defendant. 270 Sentencing courts can reach far back in time to determine what conduct relates to the defendant's convicted offense.
271 This evidence may include statements recorded by probation officers during telephone interviews or signed witness statements gathered by law enforcement or prosecutors.
272 Such reports and statements are likely to include hearsay, double hearsay, and triple hearsay.
273 During plea negotiations, defense counsel may be unaware which testimonial statements, if any, will be presented at sentencing. Moreover, there is usually little opportunity to investigate the statement's veracity once its materiality becomes apparent. Despite these serious implications, reliability is the current standard to test information presented at felony sentencing hearings.
274
Testing the veracity of testimonial statements that are material to punishment is as compelling at felony sentencing as Crawford and Davis recognize at trial. Originally, the purpose of trial was to establish the specific offense conduct that merited punishment. 275 The purpose of sentencing was to announce the punishment. 276 Little judicial discretion existed pre-Founding to influence felony sentencing.
277
Modern sentencing procedure developed post-Founding and has shifted fact finding for purposes of fixing punishment into a structured sentencing hearing that occurs independent of the trial. 278 Once guilt is rendered, either as a result of a verdict or a plea, sentencing becomes the focus of all parties and an accurate determination of facts that influence the sentence should be of primary importance for all parties.
279
Apprendi warned that modern courts must adhere to constitutional principles 280 even though the practice of unitary trial and sentencing may have changed. Alleyne provides a timely reminder of Apprendi's warning. Alleyne's vigorous (and successful) defense of the brandishing "element" was essentially rendered meaningless. 281 The Guidelines allowed reconsideration of Alleyne's acquitted conduct, specifically the brandishing charge, as a category of "relevant conduct." 282 Alleyne's sentencing court allowed the prosecution to re-allege brandishing as an "enhancement" and therefore prove it by a lower burden. Alleyne was punished as if the jury actually found brandishing. 283 For the Alleyne Court, the inherent unfairness of these procedures, from a sentencing prospective, were no trivial matter and quite troubling. 284 So too is that fact that defense counsel was not allowed use of the most effective tools to re-defend the allegation, namely cross-examination of the testimonial statements that supported the post-trial "finding" that brandishing occurred.
Due to the prevalence of plea bargaining, most cases do not result in a trial like in Alleyne. As a result, the resolution of the material facts constituting the offense occurs after the plea and usually requires the use of testimonial statements at sentencing. 285 In this manner, the sentencing hearing itself becomes quite similar to a trial but results in sentencing by ambush from the defendant's perspective.
286 The inability to crossexamine testimonial statements ties defense counsel's hands and leaves the defendant with no meaningful opportunity to test the material evidence that supports the punishment.
287 Counsel's ability to marshal and prove the facts, introduce evidence, and generally aid and assist the defendant is also significantly hindered.
288 Allowing cross-examination of testimonial statements to prove the sentencing offense lessens the risk that the defendant will be punished based on unreliable evidence.
289
This is not to say that confrontation should be required for all felony sentencing information.
290 Instead, when determining whether to require cross-examination of testimonial statements at felony sentencing, two key factors are the statement's materiality to punishment and whether cross-examination will assist in assessing veracity or truth. Determining whether testimonial statements would assist in an assessment of truth is unnecessary where material facts about the sentencing offense are admitted by the defendant and entered into the record (or plea agreement) at the time the plea is accepted. At the sentencing, the trial judge can ascertain a defendant's knowing, intelligent, and voluntary acceptance of the statement's veracity in the same manner as the court establishes the knowing, intelligent, and voluntary acknowledgement or waiver of other constitutional rights at sentencing. Where the parties do not agree, cross-examination should be allowed at felony sentencing.
Conclusion
An accurate determination of the facts that support the punishment is primary to the integrity of the U.S. criminal justice system. Bifurcated trial and sentencing is a modern felony sentencing development, but constitutional principles must still be obeyed. The fundamental unfairness and prejudice associated with punishing a defendant based on un-crossexamined testimonial statements provides sufficient reason to unbrand 285. James Edward Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas 156-57 (1975) (noting that sentencing judges rarely make detailed inquiries regarding the factual basis for the plea before accepting it).
286. See Becker, supra note 7, at 7-10. confrontation as a right that only applies at the trial stage of the criminal prosecution. Crawford and Davis make clear that actual confrontation and cross-examination are the best methods to assess the veracity of testimonial statements.
291 Eliminating the "trial-right-only" theory of the Confrontation Clause creates uniformity with the structurally identical Counsel and Jury Trial Clauses. To be sure, confrontation should not be required for all evidence presented at felony sentencing hearings. Two key factors when determining whether to require cross-examination of testimonial statements at felony sentencing are the statement's materiality to punishment and whether cross-examination will assist in assessing truth. Where both prongs of this inquiry are met, confrontation should be expanded through the sentencing stage of the felony prosecution. 
